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Lewis: Ar t  has always been concerned with articulating a position with regard to the ques- 
tion of rights. To  understand aesthetic rights simply in terms of combating interdiction, 
however, would be to  risk abnegating art's own identity in favour of putative contents that 
may or may not be censored according to the myopic interests of petty state officials. 
The intimate bond that once tied interdiction to art's modus operandi (its historical and 
delicate attempts to  circumvent the laws and protocols that forbade its invasion into cer- 
tain areas of the territorial subject matters of the state, the church, or the privileged) has 
long since expired. Today in the West, art is free to represent what i t  likes with regard to  
subject matter. 
Wall: I think that the critique of art has been approximately accomplished. That is, the 
interrogation of the foundations of its validity has reached a point at which the experience 
of art is now primarily an experience of the problem of its own validity. I do not think that 
this problem is related directly to  the problem of rights. I don't know what "aesthetic 
rights" are. A r t  is covered by the democratic rights to free speech, freedom of expression. 
I have never been concerned with interdiction on the level of subject matter because it 
barely exists in our society. Look at Joel-Peter Witken, for example. The provocations, like 
Robert Mapplethorpe's, are too much a mirror game of publicity to  be artistically interesting. 
Lewis: To  think of aesthetic rights it may be necessary to return to  and rethink the theory 
of disinterestedness articulated by Kant in his Critique of Judgement. A long line of 
commentators have tried to  keep some form of this articulation alive (Schiller, Adorno, 
Greenberg, Focillon, etc.), and they in turn have been subjected to  critical work that has 
undeniably pointed to  some of the impossible engagements that these thinkers have 
entertained with the world. But to  acknowledge these critiques is not at all to  dispose of 
the underlying drama in these, for want of a better word, formalist texts. I wonder how 
that inquiry, that formalist inquiry, might be revitalized and understood now? And  can 
we be sure that this enquiry will not get reduced to a kind of caricature of aesthetic con- 
noisseurship - the name of Walter Pater comes to mind. 
Wall: I am not interested in formalism. I think that the existence of an attitude such as 
formalism is a symptom of the decay of aesthetic language among the intelligentsia and 
the elites who support art. There are obviously many reasons for this, but it 's a sore point 
since Clement Greenberg wrote "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," where he located its causes 
in the decay of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the imperialist epoch. The philosoph- 
ical reflection of the inner contradictoriness of art demands an acceptance of the dialecti- 
cal relation of "form" and "content." The collapse of these dialectics, or of the sense of 
dialectical reflection, could be seen as Greenberg sees it, as a symptom of capitalist crisis. 
To  an extent, I think it is that, but I do not want to participate in a "progressive consensus" 
which has been so uncouth about "unprogressive" phenomena, like Matisse, Mallarme, 
Proust, or Huysmans, and many more over the years up to now. The progressive consen- 
sus is itself a symptom of a decline of the left, a decline of the social-democratic elite. For- 
malism is their b6te noire, the taboo that holds them together. There is no formalism in 
art, really. Your question about how we ensure that this does not evolve into a new Walter 
Paterism is itself part of the consensus idea of aesthetic thought. If a new Paterism 
evolves, let it - maybe that will create something marvellous. "We" should desist in imag- 
ining that "we" are called upon to  determine developments in this way. A critique of a neo- 
aestheticism would be a challenge to  the stultified analytical capacities of many members 
of the critical elite. 
Lewis: With regard to the "progressive consensus," I am less sure of its hegemony and 
the strength of the consensual bond that would hold its opinions together. What I would 
say is that the dialectical relation between form and content, the "inner contradictoriness" 
of the work of art, is really a formal concern. What may be at stake here is a general mis- 
understanding of mimesis. Certainly Kant's articulation of this fundamental relation 
between art and nature implies a critique of imitation, and this rigorous and formal think- 
ing of the question of representation is, I suspect, what you find so lacking in what you 
have called the progressive consensus. Formal concerns are central to  the question of the 
work of art's engagement with the world. A t  the same time, we are aware that a certain 
conservative connoisseurship would like nothing better than to return art to  a sort of pre- 
Copernican antitheoretical universe. 
Wall: I would put it a little differently. I'd say that artistic content is realized in the expe- 
rience of the form of a work. A work does make a "formal proposition" but maybe not in 
the form of a proposition. It 's like when Hegel says that a dialectical concept of identity, 
which insists on the "identity of identity and non-identity," must nevertheless be articu- 
lated using the word is: the propositional form of identity. 
In a way, you could say that there isn't any subject matter in a work of art. Subject mat- 
ter is like a pre-text. I t  determines nothing directly artistic about a work, but, as pre-text, 
it determines the generic character of the work that is about to  be made. This is another 
inner contradiction, I think. You begin with a subject, but the content of the subject is 
only made visible ("appears" in the Hegelian sense of necessary appearance) in the way 
the work actually looks - which comes from the ways it is made, formed, realized. 
I am not as negative as you are about what you call conservative connoisseurship. I 
think connoisseurship is an extremely theoretical approach to  art, in principle, since i t  
aims at making the subtlest distinctions between (and within) works. I feel that this termi- 
nology has just become frozen over the years and has lost the sense that critical philosophy 
and ideological critique are aspects of connoisseurship. A "serious" work of ideological 
critique begins from a concept of the "valid" and the "serious" work (or its opposite - 
counterfeit or kitsch). Connoisseurship and a canon of taste are already present in it. The 
academic radicals and conservatives have allowed themselves to  tear apart a discourse 
which is more expansive than either of their positions can recognize. I'm not interested in  
connoisseurship in its auction-house sense and the snobbism of reactionary elites, except 
where fine empirical distinctions are concerned. There, the critical elite would probably 
have a lot to  learn from a connoisseur-like study of the granular or molecular nature of 
individual, physical art works, or objects -wh ich  is what we artists make. 
Lewis: Because you use photography and because you use some of the technologies of 
advertising and public imaging in general, and, above all else, because the subject matter 
of your pictures has tended to  include particular aspects of "public life," your work can be 
understood as reengaging the fundamental connection between the museum and the pub- 
lic life that ought to  make the experience of the former a critical and aesthetic one. How 
might your work be understood as attempting - if indeed i t  is - t o  prolong this right for the 
aesthetic to be taken seriously, its refusal to  be subsumed to a more generalized econ- 
omy? 
Wall: I have always thought that public museums were at least as good a place as any- 
where else to  look at works of art, and think about them. But I have to approach the ques- 
t ion a little differently than you are doing, because the concept of aesthetic rights does 
not work for me. The seriousness of the aesthetic experience, or its being taken seriously, 
is more a question of public literacy and values, of the ethical world created by education, 
urbanism, and the interlinkage of various institutions, including religious institutions as 
well as the museum world, or the art market. Just as you have noted that legislation and 
censorship have not deterred the process of completely opening (and ending) the question 
of the subject matter of art, no mass of "rights," however conceptualized, can substitute 
for the practical construction and preservation of what could be called "worlds of serious- 
ness," established and evolving sites of praxis and reflection which are valued and protected 
by society, by institutions and social capital, and by individuals, by citizens and their prop- 
erty, or private capital. Society already has the legal means to  do this. A r t  can be sub- 
sumed in a more general economy and still be taken seriously - that is, art can be a 
commodity (which it really has to  be in capitalism) and still be taken seriously. The idea 
that the commodity status of art prevents people from taking it seriously and developing 
profound relations with it is another sacred cow of the progressive consensus. We  take 
land seriously and it is a commodity, and this could be said of any other object people 
are seriously involved with. 
Lewis: There can be no argument about whether or not art enjoys commodity status. A s  
your remarks suggest, a work that is not a commodity is a work that must remain com- 
pletely invisible. However, the commodity form is not the sum total of our relations to 
objects and things, and this might explain some of the shortcomings of much recent art 
that has attached its critique single-mindedly to  this aspect of the work's value. I think 
Adorno is useful here. 
Wall: Like Adorno recognized, the orientation here is in terms of the dialectical character 
of use-value and exchange-value, the "identity of their identity and non-identity." The com- 
modity status exhausts no object's whole existence, and art makes that visible as its beauty. 
Lewis: Identity is something which is forcefully raised as a question in your work. A l l  of 
your characters seem to emerge in your photographs in a state of tension with regard to 
identity. They are in effect on the cusp of an interpolation that would grant them a defini- 
tive identity (from bullies, from the police, from employers, from the CIA,  from landlords, 
from rituals, from prescribed moralities, etc.); yet being on the cusp they have not yet 
received that identity. The tension that surrounds them so theatrically is, I think, this sense 
of having not taken the final step, of a resistance - often silent, often no more than a 
barely visible gesture - tha t  is a utopian and perhaps impossible attempt to imagine one- 
self as producing an identity outside of any demand to identify oneself, and therefore to  
be something that is ultimately unknowable (to bullies, to police, to  landlords, to bosses, 
to the state). To  be unknowable, of course, is to be useless, a condition which the aes- 
thetic has a close interest in. 
Wall: This question of the uselessness of art I understand in its more classical sense of 
a negation of the instrumental relation to  things, people, and images. The validity of art 
is involved with this negation, in the name of reflection, and of the dialectical relation of 
vifa acfiva and vifa confemplafiva, as Hannah Arendt, for example, describes it in The 
Human Condition. I like your account of the formation of identity in my pictures - it does 
correspond to my way of thinking about them. Photography has the problem of being a 
very definitive and static mode of representation - it "fixes" things. So I have been inter- 
ested in using the static qualities of the image to focus on something fugitive and intangi- 
ble. This is an aesthetic value which for me often determines the viability of this or that 
subject for a picture. 
Lewis: Photography is now a classical medium. Your work suggests this significantly 
because it seems to point to  the probability that photography has approached the condi- 
t ion of painting. I would like to  ask you about how the two media of cinema and painting, 
the media that technologically and historically antedate and follow photography, meet 
in your images. 
Wall: 1 agree that photography has now become an art, or a medium with status equal to  
that of the older ones. Many of the critical problems have not been resolved (like the status 
of the print in relation to  the negative), but in general the debate about whether photogra- 
phy is an art of high ambition and status is over. I think that the debate about whether 
art will be anything else than photography is also finished. It is clear that the older forms, 
like painting, are not dead - they will obviously continue. We  have just been fascinated 
with the glamour of the "end" of things. I hope that's over too! I always thought that pho- 
tography attained its artistic status by means of the cinema, that before the cinema evolved 
to  the point where it had obviously become a major art form, nobody was in a position to  
comprehend the problems posed by photography in relation to the pictorial traditions. 
When cinema permitted photography to become conscious of itself as art, photography 
also became conscious of itself as nonpainting. The new imaging technologies are warp- 
ing this though, and so now we have not-photography. 
Lewis: Earlier you mentioned Huysmans and I began to think about how in the novel 
Against the Grain, Des Esseintes leaves the realm of "social utility" and his life becomes 
determined by aesthetic concerns. Hence his obsessive interest in smell and taste, which 
are peculiarly productive of the memoire involontaire. The gesture of resistance (to iden- 
tity) in your work is also like the madeleine in Proust, or for that matter the punctum in 
Barthes. It takes the moment out of i ts mise-en-scene. The whiff of its presence allows the 
picture to yield certain truths that are primarily sensed by aesthetic, formal apprehensions 
(and this is why Proust is very close to  Freud). So the decadence that Huysmans stands 
charged with could be another way of describing how he is able to understand this close 
relationship between knowledge and form. I wonder, though, if Huysmans's romanticism - 
and I introduce this new "ism" cautiously - runs the risk of displacing the concerns of, for 
want of a better word, political action into a wholly private, and ultimately unknowable, 
realm of taste. 
Wall: Maybe there is no real risk of the displacement you are concerned about. I do not 
think a concern with the formativity of art threatens the possibility of making political state- 
ments in art. Artistically, there is no other way of making them. Works like Dostoevsky's 
The Possessed, or Goya's Disasters of War, or Hedda Gabler, Olympia, or Rodin's Burghers 
of Calais, certain of Munch's pictures or Grosz's earlier works, Duchamp's Urinal - all have 
political content formulated as philosophical problem and experience of a work, an image, 
or story, etc. Or, referring to the figures you mention, think of Huysmans's analysis of anti- 
clerical extremism in La-bas, or Proust's discussions of the Dreyfus case in his novel. The 
shadings of these works, the fact they open onto different and even conflicting horizons of 
implied political behaviour, is to  me not a problem. It 's a phenomenological condition of 
art. Certainty fleeting along a curve of continually evolving experience is a model of reflex- 
ivity, and of a critical attitude. A l l  these works were and are politically effective enough. In 
art I do  not think that there ever has been the kind of polarity between inwardness and 
activism that you suggest. The relation is elsewhere - maybe it's in terms of the use-value 
of the beautiful? 
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